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Anonymised from a real EWC assessment

Sample report

Real pentest reports. Anonymised.

Two black-box assessments we delivered: one site in critical shape, one that mostly held up. Client details removed. Findings kept.

EWC / CybersecurityAnonymised from a real EWC assessment

Penetration testing and security assessment

Prepared for
Assessment
External, unauthenticated
Report
Report A, 41 pages
Reference
  • 3High
  • 7Medium
  • 7Low
  • 5Info

ConfidentialPage 1 of 41

01Assessment resultsReport A

Security at a glance

Overall risk

Critical

Rated critical: a server-level exposure could not be ruled out from outside, and several findings combine.

Findings by severity

22 findings

  • Critical0
  • High3
  • Medium7
  • Low7
  • Info5
  • 10high and medium findings to fix first
  • 41pages in the delivered report
  • 12attack classes that held up

02Executive summary

What the owner reads first

A server-level exposure that could not be ruled out from outside, open backend access and weak email protection. Patch first, then close the doors.

Business implications

The main risks: compromise of the publishing server, takeover of editor accounts and bulk harvesting of the site's directory. Missing email authentication makes the brand easy to impersonate.

Immediate priorities

Confirm and patch the server runtime. Update the CMS, protect the login and fix upload validation. Review what the public API returns and switch on email authentication.

Controls that held

No SQL injection, cross-site scripting, file inclusion, open redirect or permissive cross-origin access was confirmed in the paths examined.

03Scope and methodology

What was tested, and how

Target
A publishing website on a popular CMS, with a separate API host
Test
External black-box penetration test
Access
Unauthenticated, no source code
Window
A single overnight testing window

Method

  1. 01DNS and certificate reconnaissance
  2. 02Content and route discovery
  3. 03Parameter and injection testing
  4. 04Header and cookie review
  5. 05TLS protocol checks
  6. 06API enumeration
  7. 07Upload validation
  8. 08Targeted exploit attempts

In scope

  • Public website
  • API and CMS host
  • TLS endpoints
  • DNS and email domain records

Rules of engagement

  • No content, account or setting was edited or deleted
  • Only additive test submissions, to exercise the upload pipeline
  • Request rates kept low to avoid disruption
  • Retrieved data handed back to the client

Out of scope

  • Third-party service infrastructure
  • Signed-in CMS testing
  • Social engineering
  • Physical testing
  • Denial-of-service load

Stated limits

  • The exact runtime patch level cannot be proven from outside
  • The site's web firewall stopped one exploit probe at its first stage
  • Whether an uploaded file could run was not verifiable

Attack surface

  1. 01

    Web firewall and edge

    Public HTTP and TLS entry point for both hosts.

  2. 02

    Public website

    Dynamic pages, search, filters and a public submission form with uploads.

  3. 03

    API and CMS host

    Content API, the editors' login and integration endpoints.

  4. 04

    Email domain

    Sender policy, signing keys and DNS assurance records.

04Findings register

22 findings, ranked

  1. F-01HighServer runtime needs urgent patch verificationServer
  2. F-02HighAnonymous API access exposes the content archive and contact dataAPIFull write-up
    7.5CVSS 3.1estimatedConfirmed

    In plain English

    The publishing API lets anyone download the content archive and directory records without signing in, contact details included.

    Business implications

    An attacker can collect the directory in bulk and use named contacts and organisation details to write convincing phishing emails or phone scams. The archive itself can be copied at scale.

    What the evidence shows

    Anonymous requests returned thousands of records across several collections, including email addresses, phone numbers and postal addresses. Three requests were enough to list the collections and page through them.

    Captured requests, generalised
    GET /api/types                 200  every content type listedGET /api/directory?limit=1     200  total: GET /api/directory?limit=100   200  full records, contact fields
    1. Recommended action

      Agree which records and fields are meant to be public. Withhold private fields and unneeded metadata without breaking the public site, and add proportionate request limits.

    2. How to verify the fix

      Compare anonymous API responses with the agreed publication rules. Private fields are withheld; public pages still work.

  3. F-03HighCMS core is behind the current security releaseCMS
  4. F-04MediumA trailing slash bypasses the login-page blockSign-inFull write-up
    5.3CVSS 3.1estimatedObserved

    In plain English

    A rule blocks the normal login address. Add a slash to the end and the sign-in form loads anyway.

    Business implications

    The block meant to hide the login form can be walked around. Together with the missing throttling in F-05, editor accounts are open to password guessing and credential stuffing.

    What the evidence shows

    The login address returned 403 Forbidden. The same address with a trailing slash returned 200 and the full sign-in form. The admin routes stayed blocked.

    Captured requests, generalised
    GET /login     403  ForbiddenGET /login/    200  full sign-in formGET /admin/    403  Forbidden
    1. Recommended action

      Apply the restriction to every equivalent path. Normalise paths and test trailing-slash, encoded and double-slash variants. Keep MFA and login throttling.

    2. How to verify the fix

      Every equivalent login address gets the same decision, and real editors can still sign in.

  5. F-05MediumLogin form has no observed throttlingSign-in
  6. F-06MediumUpload form accepts falsely labelled image filesUploadsFull write-up
    5.4CVSS 3.1estimatedValidation failure

    In plain English

    The upload form accepted a file that was not an image, because the upload said it was a JPEG. The label a browser sends cannot be trusted.

    Business implications

    Trusting the sender's label lets non-image content into the upload pipeline. If such a file were stored and run as code, it could lead to server-side code execution.

    What the evidence shows

    A harmless script file labelled image/jpeg was accepted and redirected to the success page. The same bytes labelled honestly were rejected. Size and count limits held. Where the file was stored could not be recovered.

    Captured requests, generalised
    POST /submit  note.txt  type=text/plain   rejectedPOST /submit  probe     type=image/jpeg   302  successPOST /submit  oversized photo             rejected, size limit
    1. Recommended action

      Check content with a maintained image decoder, allow only the formats you need, re-encode images and generate safe names. Store uploads outside executable paths with script execution off.

    2. How to verify the fix

      Mislabelled, malformed and double-extension files are rejected, valid images still upload, and stored uploads cannot run as code.

  7. F-07MediumNo HTTPS-only policy (HSTS)Transport
  8. F-08MediumNo content security policyBrowser
  9. F-09MediumEmail authentication lacks DMARC and DKIMEmail
  10. F-19MediumAsset-style URLs cause HTML pages to be cachedCaching
  11. F-10LowUnexpected parameter types cause server errorsInput
  12. F-11LowLegacy TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are still acceptedTransport
  13. F-12LowA pre-login cookie has no explicit SameSite policySessions
  14. F-13LowDNS assurance (CAA and DNSSEC) is not publishedDNS
  15. F-14LowBackend error pages disclose the server versionDisclosure
  16. F-15LowA legacy integration endpoint returns an origin errorCMS
  17. F-20LowUnpublished article IDs are distinguishableContent
  18. F-16InfoPage fragments can be requested directlyDisclosure
  19. F-17InfoSecurity baselines differ between the two hostsConfiguration
  20. F-18InfoPublic assets expose software version hintsDisclosure
  21. F-21InfoUpload folders give distinguishable responsesDisclosure
  22. F-22InfoPublic contact addresses can be recovered by scriptsEmail

In the delivered report every finding gets this full write-up on its own page.

05Remediation plan

What to fix, in order

  1. 01First 72 hours

    Now

    3findings
    • Prove the runtime and CMS versions, stage the security updates and record the build after restart.
    • Check where uploads land and what may run there. Reject non-image content.
  2. 02First week

    Next

    4findings
    • Close the login bypass, add MFA and bounded throttling.
    • Agree which API fields are public. Confirm every mail sender, then roll out DMARC.
  3. 03Within 30 days

    Later

    15findings
    • Redirect to HTTPS, stage HSTS, test a content policy, retire legacy TLS and fix path caching.
    • Tidy input handling, cookies, DNS assurance and banners as planned maintenance.

06Positive observations

What held up

Attempted against the paths examined. None confirmed.

  • SQL injectionClean
  • Reflected cross-site scriptingClean
  • Stored cross-site scriptingClean
  • File inclusion and path traversalClean
  • Open redirectClean
  • Permissive cross-origin accessClean
  • Header injectionClean
  • Server-side request forgeryClean
  • Host-header and cache poisoningClean
  • Directory listingHardened
  • Sensitive file exposureHardened
  • ClickjackingCovered

Black-box penetration test

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  • Executive summary
  • Findings
  • Remediation plan
  • What held up