Stop criminals sending email as your business: SPF, DKIM, DMARC
What SPF, DKIM and DMARC do, the order to set them up, how to protect domains you never send from, and what to ask your email provider.
Anyone can put your domain in the “From” line of an email. Unless your domain tells receiving mail servers which messages are genuine, a fake invoice from [email protected] can land in your customer’s inbox looking exactly like the real thing.
AI makes the fake invoice more convincing: the right tone, the right names, no spelling mistakes. DMARC does not judge the wording. It checks whether the message really came from you.
Three short records in your domain’s DNS fix most of this: SPF, DKIM and DMARC. They do not live in your mailbox. They live wherever your domain’s DNS is managed, which is often your domain registrar.
The three records in plain terms
| Record | What it tells the world | What it looks like |
|---|---|---|
| SPF | Which servers are allowed to send email for your domain | v=spf1 include:… ~all |
| DKIM | A public key that checks the signature on each message you send | v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=… |
| DMARC | What to do with mail that fails, and where to send reports | v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:… |
SPF is a guest list of sending servers. DKIM is a tamper-proof seal on each message, and it survives forwarding better than SPF does. DMARC ties them together. A message passes DMARC when SPF or DKIM passes and the domain it checked matches the domain in the visible “From” line. DMARC then tells the receiver what to do with failures: nothing, send to spam, or reject.
DMARC also sends you reports. They show every server sending mail as your domain, including ones you did not know about and ones that are pretending to be you.
Before you start: list everything that sends as you
Most businesses send email from more places than they think. Before you touch DNS, write down every service that sends mail with your domain in the “From” line:
- Your mailbox provider
- Your website’s contact and order forms
- Your online store
- Invoicing and accounting software
- Newsletter and marketing tools
- Booking, CRM and helpdesk systems
- Office scanners and printers that email documents
Each one needs to be in your SPF record or sign with DKIM, or it will fail once DMARC is enforced. Ask each supplier for their exact SPF value. Do not copy it from an example.
Set it up in this order
- Publish one SPF record. Put every sending service in it. SPF allows at most 10 DNS lookups. Each
includecounts, and so does every include inside it. Go over and the SPF check fails, often without anyone noticing. The NCSC suggests moving bulk senders such as newsletters to their own subdomain, for examplenews.yourbusiness.com, to stay under the limit. - Turn on DKIM in every sending service. Each one gives you a record to publish. Ask for signing with your own domain, not the supplier’s.
- Publish DMARC with
p=none. This is monitoring only. The NCSC notes it does not change how your email is delivered. Add aruaaddress so reports reach you. They usually start arriving within 24 hours. - Read the reports and fix the gaps. Every legitimate service that fails needs fixing before the next step. Take your time here.
- Move to
p=quarantine. Mail that fails now goes to spam. Keep reading the reports. - Move to
p=reject. Mail that fails is refused. The NCSC says many organizations take around three months to get from quarantine to reject, and recommends watching reports closely for at least two weeks after the switch. If real mail starts failing, go back to quarantine, fix it, and try again.
A reject policy is realistic, not a stretch goal. In 2017 the US Department of Homeland Security gave federal agencies one year to put their domains at p=reject.
Protect the domains you never send from
Criminals like spare domains: the old business name, the .net you bought to stop someone else having it, the campaign site from three years ago. If a domain never sends email, say so. The NCSC recommends these four records for parked domains:
yourspare.com. TXT "v=spf1 -all"
_dmarc.yourspare.com. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:[email protected]"
yourspare.com. MX 0 .
*._domainkey.yourspare.com. TXT "v=DKIM1; p="
In order: no server may send, reject anything that tries, accept no incoming mail, and no message is ever signed. Apply as many as your DNS panel allows.
If the reports go to a different domain, as here, that domain must agree to receive them. Add this record to yourbusiness.com: yourspare.com._report._dmarc.yourbusiness.com. TXT "v=DMARC1".
What to ask your email provider
Send these questions to your email provider, or to whoever manages your DNS:
- Which SPF value do I need for your service, and how many DNS lookups does it use?
- Can you sign my mail with DKIM using my own domain? How do I rotate the key?
- Do you check DMARC on mail coming in to my mailboxes, and do you act on
p=reject? - Who will receive and read the DMARC reports, and can you turn them into a readable summary?
- Do your mail servers offer encrypted delivery (STARTTLS)?
- Is two-step sign-in enforced on the admin console that controls my mailboxes?
- Do any of your other features, such as calendar invites or shared forms, send mail as my domain?
If the answer to any of these is “we don’t support that”, it is worth knowing now.
Checklist
- Every service that sends as your domain is listed
- One SPF record, under 10 lookups
- DKIM signing on in every sending service
- DMARC at
p=nonewith reports arriving - Reports reviewed and legitimate senders passing
- DMARC at
p=quarantine - DMARC at
p=rejectand monitored - Parked domains locked down with all four records
- Provider questions answered in writing
Where EWC can help
AI-assisted attacks move fast. We test against the techniques attackers use today, so you can close gaps before they are found.
Our Business email setup creates a mailbox on your own domain with SPF, DKIM, an initial DMARC policy and two-step sign-in in place, then checks that mail sends and arrives before handing it over.
Surse
Pe ce se bazează acest articol.
10 surse- NCSCEmail security and anti-spoofingncsc.gov.uk
- NCSCCreate and iterate an SPF recordncsc.gov.uk
- NCSCImplement a DMARC policy of 'none'ncsc.gov.uk
- NCSCReject spoof emailsncsc.gov.uk
- NCSCProtecting parked domains for the UK public sectorncsc.gov.uk
- IETFRFC 9989: Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC)datatracker.ietf.org
- IETFRFC 9990: DMARC Aggregate Reportingdatatracker.ietf.org
- CISABOD 18-01: Enhance Email and Web Securitycisa.gov
- NCSCThe near-term impact of AI on the cyber threatncsc.gov.uk
- NCSCImpact of AI on cyber threat from now to 2027ncsc.gov.uk


